ABSTRACT
Introduction:
The modern corporation, as defined by (Berle & Means, 1932) , manifests the strained relationship between the owner and the manager. In such companies, managers are agents of the principals who are delegated with decision-making authority in the absence of these dispersed owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . Inherently opportunistic, managers are self-serving economic agents who values own interests rather than the owners' objectives. Consequently, being managers of others' money, they are not expected to take care of it with the same anxious vigilance as if their own (Smith, 1776) . This gives rise to conflict of interests, thereby, resulting in agency problems (Fama & Jensen, 1983) . Information asymmetry further accelerates this problem by making it difficult for the principal to verify their agents' actions (Dey, 2008) . As a result, managers are likely to take actions that maximize their utility, even when those actions do not maximize shareholders' wealth (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986) The principal can, nevertheless, limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 308) . Executive rewards are, therefore, tied to shareholders' returns in order to subsume the managers' interests in the corporate objectives. This, in turn, squarely relates top managers' pay with corporate performance. Thus, the theoretical explanation underlying this relationship, is the agency theory which has, over decades, fostered an expansive stream of research linking executive pay with corporate performance (Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) ; (Lin, 2005) ; (Colpan & Yoshikawa, 2012) , thereby establishing the pay-performance paradigm. Though these studies have mainly been conducted in the western part of the globe (Gill, 2014) , this area is fast catching research interest in the developing economies as well due to its economic significance. A continuous dilemma that often surrounds the media, practitioners, regulators, and the public at large is that, 'are the enormous top executive pay packages justified according to their company's performance?' Abnormally high pay, according to some, signifies unresolved agency problems (Carter, Marcus, & Tehranian, 2016) . Although there are ongoing debates about the strength and implications of this relationship, the overall consensus seems to point out that pay-performance relationships are not very strong (Jensen & Murphy, 1990) ; (Izan, Sidhu, & Taylor, 1998) ; (Otten, 2007) ; (Gigliotti, 2013) .In a pursuit to explore the same in the Indian setting, the present study conducts an analysis of the strength and magnitude of incentives provided by firm performance with respect to executive compensation. Throughout the paper, the terms 'compensation' and 'compensation' have been used interchangeably to denote the remuneration of the top executives. The present study contributes to the executive compensation literature in three ways. First, the paper adds to the scant empirical evidence investigating the justification for enormous executive pay packages in the Indian economy which is already characterized by income inequality. Second, by using robust statistical tools the study measures the responsiveness of pay to performance in both absolute as well as in relative terms.Third, to the best of the researcher's knowledge, no study conducted in India, other than the study conducted by Gill (2014) , has included long-term compensation in the form of stock option grants in the computation of total compensation. Hopefully, the findings of the study will provide researchers and practitioners valuable insights on the responsiveness of pay to performance in the Indian business landscape.
Literature Review:
The extravagant top managerial remuneration has been, over the years, touching new levels. These levels have often been probed in the context of whether they are in line with the principals' objectives. In addition to the levels, this link can be captured by way of changes which portray the growth in directors' pay and nets out factors which remain constant over time (Gregg, Machin, & Szymanski, 1993) . The seminal work of (Jensen & Murphy, 1990) brought the Pay-Performance Sensitivity (PPS) model in the forefront of the compensation discussions. In this study, conducted during 1974 to 1986, the sample US companies exhibited a low responsiveness of $3.25 change in pay for every $1,000 change in performance which raised many questions on the theory underlying executive pay. (Gregg, Machin, & Szymanski, 1993) were also sceptical of the pay for performance sensitivity in a sample of 288 large UK listed companies during the period 1983-91. In consonance, (Garen, 1994) found a low explanatory power of the empirical model testing PPS. In another study conducted using UK sample companies, (Conyon, 1997) found a positive relation between cash compensation of the highest paid director and current year shareholder returns. However, the authors failed to find any relation between top directors' pay and pre-dated shareholder returns. Taking Return on Assets (ROA) as the performance measure, similar results were reported by (Ghosh, 2006) in the Indian context, who found the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay to be contingent only upon the present-year accounting performance. (Benito & Conyon, 1999) , in stark contrast, found directors' cash compensation to be positively related to pre-dated shareholder returns. Disaggregating CEOs' cash compensation into salary and bonus, (Banker, Darrough, Huang, & Plehn-Dujowich, 2013) added that the present-year salary was positively associated with both past as well as future performance, as measured by Return on Equity (ROE), whereas bonus was not. Besides, (Hall & Liebman, 1998) recognized the responsiveness of pay to performance in relative terms using percentages known as the PayPerformance Elasticity (PPE) model. Taking a larger sample of US publicly traded companies, the authors, in juxtaposition, found a strong pay-performance relationship over 1980 to 1994, mainly on account of increased stock option grants. In this context, (Kim, 2010) revealed that the sensitivity of stock-based pay to performance is more pronounced in volatile firms. Interestingly, (Kato & Long, 2006) found significant sensitivity and elasticity of cash compensation with shareholder value in a large sample of Chinese listed firms. Overall, these studies signal towards the strong responsiveness of both long-term as well as short-term incentives to corporate performance. Further, supporting agency theory, (Conyon & Peck, 1998) observed that shareholder returns predict top director's pay. (Ke, Petroni, & Safieddine, 1999 ) also found support for the optimal contracting theory by establishing a significantly positive relationship between CEO pay and accounting performance among publicly-held firms that have diffused ownership. Likewise, a number of studies e.g. (Kim, 2004) ; (Cheng & Firth, 2006) report a positive relation between accounting performance measures, like ROA and ROE, with executive pay. Moreover many authors (e.g., (Hall & Liebman, 1998) ; (Aggarwal & Samwick, 1999) have found pay to be positively related with market performance measures such as Total Shareholder Return (TSR). Although with varying magnitudes, executive compensation typically has a positive relationship with corporate performance (e.g., (Agrawal, Makhija, & Mandelker, 1991) ; (Mehran, 1995) ; (Baber, Janakiraman, & Kang, 1996) ; (Bhattacherjee, Jairam, & Shanker, 1998) ; (Hall & Liebman, 1998) ; (Ke et al., 1999) ; (Wallsten, 2000) ; (Carpenter & Sanders, 2002) ; (Kim, 2004) ; (Ghosh, 2006) ; (Leone, Wu, & Zimmerman, 2006) ; (Kato & Long, 2006) ; (Shim, Lee, & Joo, 2009) ; (Kim, 2010) .A number of studies, however, report the presence of a weak or negative relationship. For instance, (Izan, Sidhu, & Taylor, 1998) 2004 and 2009 . (Gill, 2014 , using both PPS and PPE models, moreover, observed that top executives in the sample Indian companies were drawing enormous compensation even when their companies were performing poorly. Lately, (Alves, Couto, & Francisco, 2016) , in a sample of Portuguese listed companies studied over 2002-11, also found the variability in CEO pay as explained by shareholder returns to be small. Likewise, (Fabbri & Marin, 2015) found the relationship between executive pay and firm performance (as measured by net profits) to be weak in a sample of large German firms over the period 1977 to 2009.As evident, researchers have put the strength of the pay-performance relationship to question (e.g., (Jensen & Murphy, 1990) ; (Haid & Yurtoglu, 2006) ; (Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2006) , thereby providing the rationale for the following hypothesis: H: There exists a positive but weak relationship between executive pay and corporate performance.
Research Methodology:
Sample Selection: A total of 209 companies were selected from the companies listed on the S&P BSE 500 Index as on 31 March 2013, formed the final sample for the purpose of this study. The data for the present study was collected from FY 2008-09 up to FY 2012-13 from the corporate database Prowess, and the annual reports of the sample companies. For selecting the final sample, companies which were not a part of the said index, during the complete study period, were not considered. Moreover, due to varying managerial pay practices, banking and financial service sector companies along with government owned companies were deleted. Companies which have undergone major corporate restructuring during the course of the study were also removed. Further, companies with financial year other than 31 st March were kept out of the final sample. Finally, companies without any executive board of directors for any year during the study were excluded from the sample.
Variable Selection and Description:
The variables of utmost importance for studying the pay-performance relationship are executive compensation and corporate performance. In order to bring forth the pay-performance strength, compensation has been taken in both absolute and relative terms. The absolute change in pay (ΔPAY) is defined as change in executive compensation for the period't' compared to the period't -1'. The change in pay in relative terms (ΔlnPAY), on the other hand, has been calculated as the natural logarithm of executive compensation for the year't' minus the natural logarithm of compensation for the year 't -1'. For the purpose of the present analysis, the dependent variable, executive pay, comprises of both cash pay (CPAY) and total pay (TPAY). Cash pay is the sum of salary and annual bonus/commission. Total pay, on the other hand, includes both cash and non-cash pay components, i.e., salary, perks, allowances, retiral benefits, bonus/commission and stock option grants. Stock option awards have been computed following the pioneering study of (Black & Scholes, 1973) , as adjusted for dividends by (Merton, 1973) . The independent variable, corporate performance, has been defined in absolute terms in four ways, i.e., delta Shareholder Wealth (ΔSW), delta Sales (ΔSALES), delta Net Income (ΔNI), and delta Operating Income (ΔOI). ΔSW is computed as TSR at period 't' times, the market capitalization at period 't -1' as used by (Jensen & Murphy, 1990) , (Murphy, 1999) , (Zhou, 2000) , (Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2006) , (Bootsma, 2010) , (Gill, 2014 ), etc. Following (Jensen & Murphy, 1990 , the accounting measures of ΔSALES, ΔNI, and ΔOI have been taken as the value at period't' minus the value at period 't -1'. The following relative performance measures have also been included: delta of natural logarithm Shareholder Wealth (ΔlnSW), sales Growth (GROWTH),delta ROA (ΔROA), and delta ROE (ΔROE). ΔlnSW is calculated as the natural logarithm of (1 + TSR) at time 't' as defined by (Murphy, 1999) , (Conyon & Murphy, 2000) , (Bootsma, 2010) , (Gill, 2014) , etc. Growth has been measured as the natural logarithm of sales at time 't' minus the natural logarithm of sales at time 't -1' following (Bootsma, 2010) . The accounting measures of ΔROA and ΔROE have been computed as the value at time't' minus the value at time't -1' e.g. (Kato & Kubo, 2006) ; (Bootsma, 2010) ; (Gill, 2014) etc.
Framework for Analysis:
The strength of the pay-performance relationship has been analysed using the PPS and the PPE models. Before testing these models empirically, the normality of the data has been tested. An initial inspection of the normal curve fitted on the histogram, reflected the skewed nature of the data. Thereafter, the data was subjected to more rigorous tests of normality viz., Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Kolmogorov, 1933) ; (Smirnov, 1933) and Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro & Wilk, 1965) . However, both these statistical tests failed to establish the data normality and the presence of outliers was detected by constructing box plots for all variables under investigation. In order to find a solution to this problem and derive meaningful results, robust regression technique was applied on the following models:
Pay-Performance Sensitivity Model:
In their seminal work, (Jensen & Murphy, 1990) documented the PPS model to estimate the strength of the pay-performance relationship in absolute terms. The model ascertains the amount change in executive compensation with respect to `1.00 change in performance. This relation is valid only under the assumption, that the prospect of losing a given rupee has the same impact on executives, irrespective of their wealth (Gill, 2014) . The primary advantage of this model is that sensitivities have a more natural economic interpretation as it represents the executive's share of value creation (Murphy, 1999) . The magnitude of the strength will be estimated through beta coefficient using the following regression equation:
ΔPAY it
= α + βΔPERF it + ε it (1) where,
ΔPAY it =
Change in executive compensation of company i in period t compared to period t -1.
ΔPERF it = Change in performance of company i in period t compared to period t -1.
Pay-Performance Elasticity Model:
(Hall & Liebman, 1998) Introduced a relative measure to ascertain the percentage change in pay with respect to change in performance by 1 percent. This definition is based on the assumption that what matters to executives is the percentage change in wealth (Gill, 2014, p. 98) . Among the sensitivity and elasticity approach, neither of the two is dominant over the other (Murphy, 1999 ). Yet, the elasticity approach produces a better fit as rates of return, rather than changes in performance, explain more about the crosssectional variation in pay. In addition, unlike the sensitivity coefficient, which varies monotonically with firm size, the elasticity measure is relatively invariant to firm size (Gibbons & Murphy, 1992) .However, the change in compensation is amplified, when the variables are measured as percentage changes (Kim, 2004) .Elasticity estimates will be computed using the following model: 
Results and Discussion:
Descriptive Statistics: Along with the statistics for the complete period, Table 1 presents period-wise descriptive statistics for all the variables used to study the strength of the payperformance relation. Panel A of Table 1 reports the descriptive information pertaining to pay and performance variables by their amount changed from the previous period. Pressing upon the gravity of the issue, the average ΔCPAY and ΔTPAY show aberrant behaviour during some years on account of extreme observations. Overall, the average ΔSW is showing large variability. Corresponding to the average, a much lower median value has been observed. An overall positive pattern of ΔSALES has been observed during the course of the study. The sample companies, in contrast, do not display consistent pattern of ΔNI over the years. On the other hand, the statistics pertaining to ΔOI project a positive trend. Further, Panel B of Table 1 presents the respective changes in the selected pay and performance measures in terms of percentage. Over the years, the average ΔlnCPAY is positive. Similar trend has been observed in the case of ΔlnTPAY. The period-wise average ΔlnSW shows that, over the years, shareholders' wealth has been increasing. However, towards the end of the study, this average value begins to recede. With respect to the sample companies, a positive trend has also been reflected by GROWTH during each year studied. In contrast, statistics pertaining to ΔROA portray a declining trend. Concurrently, ΔROE also showcases a gradual declining trend. The overall negative ΔROE vis-à-vis an overall positive change in both pay measures, further, provide an elementary indication of the problem of excessive pay to the executives. These observations made from the Volume VIII Issue 2, May 2017 11 www.scholarshub.net descriptive statistics will be instrumental for subsequent detailed analysis.
Regression Results:
Sensitivity of Pay to Performance: 2013). Yet, the magnitude of the relation of pay with net income is too low which clearly indicates the inadequate compliance of the legal stipulations.
Elasticity of Pay to Performance:
Taking ΔlnCPAY as the dependent variable, Model 9 to 12 estimates the pay-performance elasticities as reported in Table 4 . In Model 9, the predictor variable, ΔlnSW, is found to follow a pattern of negative association with ΔlnCPAY up till 2011-12. Though the results show a negative trend, this impact is insignificant to penalize the executives for shareholders' wealth maximization. However, in 2012-13, the relative responsiveness of pay to this market-based performance measure has significantly improved as shown by an increase of 0.69 percent (β = 0.069, p< 0.01) in CPAY corresponding to every 10 percent increase in SW. Even though highly significant, this impact is inadequate to motivate executive efforts towards improved company performance. For the period 1983-91, (Gregg, Machin, & Szymanski, 1993 ) observed a similar trend in a sample of UK companies. Later, (Bootsma, 2010) also reported a comparable cash pay elasticity coefficient with shareholder wealth in the Netherlands. Likewise, (Ghosh, 2010) observed a significant, however, weak sensitivity of executive pay in relation to ROA among sample Indian manufacturing companies. Gill (2014), on the other hand, reported an insignificant link between pay and ROA. Contrary to these Indian studies, the present results are in conformance with those reported in the US context by (Kim, 2004) . The author recognized a significantly high impact of change in ROA on top executive pay as reported in the present study. Moreover, unlike any other measure, ΔROE exhibits a significant impact on ΔlnCPAY during all the years under study, as shown in Model 12. This consistent pattern of impact presses upon the important role played by ROE in determining executive compensation. Taking ΔlnTPAY as the dependent variable, Table 5 reports the results of Model 13 to 16. Similar trend in terms of strength and magnitude, as reported by Model 9 and 10 using ΔlnCPAY as the dependent variable, has been observed in Model 13 and 14.
Further with respect to Model 15, a 9.57 percent (β = 0.957, p< 0.05) increase in TPAY during 2009-10 in relation to a 10 percent increase in ROA is very forthcoming. Besides, the results reported in Model 16 for ΔlnTPAY, replicate the pattern followed by ΔlnCPAY in Model 12.
Overall, a stronger pay-accounting performance relationship vis-à-vis the relationship between pay and market-based firm performance is a noteworthy observation as reflected from the results of both models. Similar findings have been reported by (Raithatha & Komera, 2016) in a large sample of Indian listed firms studied during 2002-12. The timeseries analysis of the PPS and the PPE model shows that the change in company performance influence pay as reflected through significant positive coefficients. Although positive, these coefficients are too small to drive the executives towards better corporate performance. Moreover, majority of the models exhibit an inconsistent pattern and report considerably small estimates. Therefore, together with PPS, PPE model also show a positive yet weak payperformance relationship, thereby extending complete support for H, i.e., there exists a positive but weak relationship between executive pay and corporate performance.
Conclusion:
The present study seeks justification for executive pay awards in incentives provided by corporate performance through measuring its strength and magnitude. Further, the study is motivated by the concern for identifying the seriousness of the issue of unjustified rewards in India. This objective has been accomplished by formulating two base models often found to be studied by researchers in the realm of executive pay literature. Depicting the change in terms of amount and percentage, these models have been adopted by researchers worldwide. Overall, the results extend an evidence of a weak positive link between pay and performance in terms of changes. The present study can be replicated using a larger sample of companies and for a longer span of time. It is, however, equally plausible to argue that as much, if not more, media policy attention has been focused on pay levels as on changes (Cosh & Hughes, 1997, p. 482) . Moreover, acceptance of the hypothesis of a positive yet weak pay-performance relationship induces the need to explore additional theoretical underpinnings for a better understanding of the 'pay problem'. Further, future research could critically appraise the impact of law and key pay reforms in determining managerial compensation.
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